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I. Introduction
This paper explores California’s and Massachusetts’ Global Warming
Solutions Acts, the policy plans released by each state’s lead regulatory 
agencies, and related laws that form each states’ greenhouse gas regulatory 
framework.  First, it examines California’s renewable portfolio standard 
(“RPS”) and Global Warming Solutions Act, including the legal battles 
California has faced in defending various aspects of its greenhouse gas 
regulation framework.  Then, it discusses the laws comprising 
Massachusetts’ greenhouse gas regulation framework, including the 
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (“RGGI”), an agreement between several 
northeastern states to jointly limit their total greenhouse gas emissions.  It 
will also examine legal hurdles RGGI has overcome.  Finally, this paper sets 
forth elements critical to a greenhouse gas regulation framework using the 
early successes of California and Massachusetts as a model. 
II. California
A. California’s Renewable Portfolio Standard
In 2002, the California legislature established the state’s first RPS, 
which required 20% of the energy from its investor-owned utilities to come 
from renewable sources by 2017.1  In each of the following two years, the 
California Energy Commission (“CEC”) published reports recommending 
acceleration of the RPS program to 33% by 2020.2  The legislature responded 
to these recommendations in 2006 by passing S.B. 107, which increased the 
mandate to require 20% of electricity generated from renewable sources by 
2010.3  To prevent utility recalcitrance, the legislature directed the California 
Public Utilities Commission (“CPUC”) to require each retail electricity seller 
to procure at least 1% renewable energy generation additional to the 
amount procured the previous year.4  Publicly owned utilities set their own 
RPS goals at varying levels, but recognize the legislature’s intent to attain 
* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2015;
B.A., University of Southern California, 2012.  I would like to thank the staff of West-
Northwest for their hard work.
1. S.B. 1078, ch. 516, §3, 2002 CAL. STAT. 2942, 2949 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE). 
2. Cal. Energy Comm’n, California Renewable Energy Overview and Programs,
ENERGY.CA.GOV, http://www.energy.ca.gov/renewables/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2015). 
3. S.B. 107, ch. 464, 2006 Cal. Stat. 3298 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of CAL. PUB. RES. CODE and CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE). 
4. S.B. 107, ch. 464, §9, 2006 Cal. Stat. 3298, 3309 (codified as amended at CAL.
PUB. RES. CODE § 25746). 
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20% by 2010.5  The CEC was tasked with certifying eligible renewable energy 
sources (e.g., solar, wind, small hydro, and biomass facilities) and designing 
and implementing an accounting system to verify compliance with the RPS.6   
By 2008, the CPUC had approved more than sixty-three gigawatts of 
renewable energy contracts for its investor-owned utilities—demonstrating 
the viability of renewable energy in an arena dominated by fossil fuels.7  In 
November 2008, Executive Order S-14-08 further accelerated California’s 
RPS goal by requiring that all retail sellers of electricity serve their load with 
33% renewable energy by 2020.8  This executive action was implemented 
through the coordinated action of multiple state agencies, like the CPUC, 
CEC, California Air Resources Board (“CARB”), the Department of Fish and 
Game (for appropriate land use), and even the Western Governors’ 
Association (to facilitate efficient development of renewable energy through 
a regional cap-and-trade system).9   
Unfortunately, California was only able to procure about 18% 
renewable energy sources by 2010, narrowly missing its stated goal.10  One 
author cites the overlapping and unclear lines of authority in implementing 
the standard as a primary cause of failing to meet the target.11  In an effort to 
meet future goals, the state executive office directed the CPUC, CEC, and 
California Independent System Operator (“CAISO”), under a series of 
executive orders and the RPS statutes, to work together with stakeholders to 
identify how and where renewable energy can be developed.12  Executive 
Order S-21-09 directs those agencies to “provide advice and assistance to, 
and cooperate with” CARB in its implementation of RPS-related regulation.13  
Coordinating this united effort of agencies has proven to be a difficult task 
because they have struggled to coalesce their varying perspectives and 
harmoniously implement different facets of the RPS program.14  
Additionally, inconsistent positions in related policy areas have resulted 
5. Cal. Energy Comm’n, California Renewable Energy Overview and Programs,
ENERGY.CA.GOV, http://www.energy.ca.gov/renewables/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2015). 
6. S.B. 107, ch. 464, §9, 2006 Cal. Stat. 3298, (codified as amended at CAL. PUB.
RES. CODE § 25746). 
7. Cal. Exec. Order S-14-08 (Nov. 17, 2008), http://gov.ca.gov/news.
php?id=11072. 
8. Id.
9. Cal. Exec. Order S-14-08, supra note 7.
10. Debroah Behles, Why California Failed to Meet its RPS Target, 17 HASTINGS W.-
N.W. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 163, 170 (2011). 
11. Id. at 172.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
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from numerous executive orders directing different agencies to handle 
overlapping responsibilities, further slowing the administrative process.15 
Nonetheless, in an effort to further California’s ambitious effort, 
Governor Edmund Brown and the legislature passed S.B. X1-2, which 
codified the 33% by 2020 requirement.16  Critically, this bill applied to all 
electricity retailers in the state: investor and publicly owned utilities, 
electricity service providers, and community choice aggregators.17  In 2013, 
California’s large investor owned utilities served 22.7% of their retail 
electricity sales with renewable power.18  While the 33% by 2020 goal seems 
difficult to reach, several California agencies have engaged in an iterative 
policy development process that is pushing electricity sales toward the 
ambitious goal.  For example, the CPUC has been developing simpler 
procurement mechanisms to streamline the application process for 
renewable generators19 and has enjoyed the success of the California Solar 
Initiative, a program with a two billion dollar budget over ten years.20  The 
CEC is administering a four hundred million dollar program, called the New 
Solar Homes Partnership, to offer incentives for solar installations and 
energy efficiency in new residential construction.21   
In sum, RPS development in California has been mostly successful at 
procuring renewable generation, despite its struggles, because it has 
encouraged policy evolution to ensure effective and appropriate regulation 
of the burgeoning renewable industry.  As regulators continue to develop 
policy tools to push utilities forward, they become better equipped and 
trained to regulate the growing industry.  While it is impossible to design 
the perfect renewable procurement methods overnight, the development 
and availability of policy tools has proven critical in pushing California’s RPS 
program in the right direction over time.  Moreover, as this paper will reveal, 
15. Id. at 172–73.
16. S.B. X1-2, ch. 1, § 20, 2011 Cal. Legis. Serv. 5775, 5791 (West) (codified as
amended at CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 399.15). 
17. Cal. Energy Comm’n, California Renewable Energy Overview and Programs,
ENERGY.CA.GOV, http://www.energy.ca.gov/renewables/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2015).  For 
discussion on importance of broad utility inclusion, see Miriam Fischlein & Timothy 
M. Smith, Revisiting renewable portfolio standard effectiveness: policy design and outcome
specification matter, 46 POL’Y SCI. 277, 281 (2013).
18. California Renewables Portfolio Standard, CPUC.CA.GOV, http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/
PUC/energy/Renewables (last visited Feb. 10, 2015). 
19. See e.g., CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N Ruling 11-05-005.
20. Cal. Energy Comm’n, California Renewable Energy Overview and Programs,
ENERGY.CA.GOV, http://www.energy.ca.gov/renewables (last visited Feb. 10, 2015). 
21. What is the New Solar Homes Partnership?, GOSOLARCALIFORNIA.ORG,
http://www.gosolarcalifornia.org/about/nshp.php (last visited Feb. 10, 2015). 
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the RPS is relatively immune to legal challenges when compared to the 
Global Warming Solutions Act, which mandates that regulated entities begin 
internalizing the costs of carbon emissions.22 
B. California’s Global Warming Solutions Act
1. Background and Current Scoping Plan Status
The Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006 (“AB 32”) requires California 
to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels by 2020.23  Pursuant 
to this goal, the legislature directed CARB to adopt regulations that “achieve 
the maximum technologically feasible and cost-effective greenhouse gas 
emission reductions.”24  The bill also directed CARB to adopt market-based 
compliance mechanisms.25  In the broader context of quarreling over climate 
change in national politics, California defined carbon dioxide as a 
“greenhouse gas”26 and declared that “[g]lobal warming poses a serious 
threat to the economic well-being, public health, natural resources, and the 
environment of California.”27 
In order to fulfill AB 32’s goals, CARB is required to develop, and 
update every five years, a Scoping Plan that identifies technologically 
feasible and cost-effective regulations for reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions.28  These regulations will be evaluated using a cost-benefit 
analysis that takes into account both economic and noneconomic benefits 
of the plan.29  Moreover, CARB must coordinate with the CPUC and CEC in 
publishing its plan30 and conduct public workshops to gather comments on 
plan updates.31  These general statutory directives proved beneficial in 
future litigation over the Scoping Plan because they gave CARB broad 
authority to design and implement climate change law. 
22. California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, ch. 488, 2006 Cal. Stat.
3419 (codified at CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38500). 
23. Id.
24. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38562 (West 2014).
25. HEALTH & SAFETY § 38570.
26. HEALTH & SAFETY § 38505(g).  The other gases included in this definition are
methane, nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, sulfur hexafluoride, 
and nitrogen trifluoride. 
27. HEALTH & SAFETY § 38501(a).
28. HEALTH & SAFETY § 38561(a).
29. HEALTH & SAFETY § 38561(d).
30. HEALTH & SAFETY § 38561(a).
31. HEALTH & SAFETY § 38561(g).
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Key regulatory elements of the initial Scoping Plan included expanding 
energy efficiency programs (e.g., setting building and appliance standards), 
increasing the state’s RPS goal to 33% by 2020, strengthening greenhouse 
gas emission standards on passenger vehicles, supporting development of 
the California high speed rail project, and developing a cap-and-trade 
program.32  The initial plan and the May 2014 Update identified and 
recommended greenhouse gas reduction measures in six key areas of the 
state’s economy: energy, transportation, agriculture, water, waste 
management, and natural and working lands.33 
Pursuant to California’s zero net energy building goals, the CEC 
updated new residential construction energy efficiency standards to 25%, 
and 30% for nonresidential construction.34  It also adopted efficiency 
standards for televisions, battery chargers, and is considering creating 
additional appliance categories to regulate consumer electronics, lighting, 
and water appliances.35  Additionally, the Scoping Plan supports demand 
response programs, localized renewable energy, and energy storage.36  
Together, these developments will better equip California’s electric grid and 
regulators for emerging technologies from the energy industry that are 
designed to further enable renewable procurement.   
In the transportation sector, the Advanced Clean Cars program, part of 
the Zero Emission Vehicle Regulation, requires 15% of new cars sold in 
California to be plug-in hybrid, battery electric, or fuel cell vehicles by 
2025.37  Ten other states have adopted California’s Zero Emission Vehicle 
Regulation, expanding the reach of California’s policy to nearly a quarter of 
the United States vehicle market.38  Another major component of the 
Scoping Plan is investment in the high-speed rail project, predicted to be 
running from San Francisco to Los Angeles by 2029.39  California also 
adopted a low-carbon fuel standard in 2009 that requires the carbon 
intensity of transportation fuels to be reduced by at least 10% by 2020.40  
32. AIR RES. BD. & CAL. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, FIRST UPDATE TO THE CLIMATE 
CHANGE SCOPING PLAN 4 (2014), available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/scopingplan/2013_ 
update/first_update_climate_change_scoping_plan.pdf.  
33. Id. at 35.
34. Id. at 37.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 39–41.
37. Id. at 47.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 5.  The Scoping Plan is devoid of specific elements designed to
bolster the high-speed rail project besides coordinate among state agencies to study 
and invest in the project. 
40. Id. at 48.
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However, CARB noted that “[a]chieving the GHG and air quality goals will 
require a renewable portfolio of transportation fuels—including electricity 
and hydrogen—well beyond the current policy trajectories.”41  CARB added 
that by the end of 2014 it would consider extending the standard with more 
aggressive targets for 2030 to push development of a renewable portfolio of 
transportation fuels.42  
AB 32 and the Scoping Plan have also taken on California’s agricultural 
sector in an effort to reduce the industry’s methane, carbon dioxide, nitrous 
oxide, and black carbon emissions, which accounted for about 8% of 
California’s total greenhouse gas emissions in 2012.43  However, CARB has 
not been as successful in the agricultural sector as it has been in the 
transportation sector.  For example, the initial plan included the installation 
of manure digesters to reduce methane emissions as a voluntary strategy, 
and unsurprisingly, adoption of these digesters in dairies has not increased 
to the levels that CARB expected.44  CARB asserts that the minimal success 
in the agricultural sector may be due to the limited research in this area and 
that there are a wide variety of farm sizes, animals, and crops produced, 
which make it difficult to find any “one-size-fits-all” emission reduction or 
carbon sequestration strategies.45 
Another component of the Scoping Plan is the Cap-and-Trade 
Regulation, a strategy enabled by AB 32’s market compliance mechanism 
chapter.  In January 2013, CARB launched the second-largest greenhouse gas 
cap-and-trade program in the world with a hard and declining cap on 
approximately 85% of total statewide greenhouse gas emissions.46  
Currently, offsets and respective protocols exist for the six greenhouse gases 
identified by AB 32, as well as for emissions of greenhouse gases prevented 
through forestry, urban forestry, manure digesters, and ozone-depleting 
substance destruction.47  In January 2014, California and Quebec linked their 
cap-and-trade programs and the two states have worked together to 
harmonize regulations and coordinate a joint auction platform.48  However, 
the May 2014 Update to the Scoping Plan lacked details about what is 
41. Id. at 49.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 57.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 58.
46. Id at 86.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 87.  CARB is also considering coordination with international sector-
based offset programs like REDD+.  Id. 
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planned to further bolster the cap-and-trade program, besides program 
review and further research into offset protocol development.49 
The May 2014 update to the Scoping Plan also addressed other sectors 
of California’s economy, such as water, waste management, natural lands, 
green buildings, and short-lived climate pollutants.  CARB has been most 
successful in the transportation and energy sectors, where there has been a 
significant drop in carbon emissions since 2007.50  Despite 2012, the first 
year of increased total carbon emissions since 2007,51 California’s per capita 
greenhouse gas emissions have decreased by 11.6% between 2000 and 
2012.52  California’s agencies are continuing to plan and develop regulation 
of the identified industries.  However, since the initial scoping plan, CARB’s 
regulations have faced several legal challenges, some raising major 
constitutional issues. 
2. Legal Challenges to AB 32
Various elements of AB 32 have been subject to challenges in state 
and federal court.  However, CARB is well positioned to issue regulation in 
California that addresses climate change because AB 32 has largely 
withstood those legal battles.  In state court, environmental justice 
organizations contended that the cap-and-trade program was too flawed to 
be a reasonable interpretation of AB 32.  Additionally, in federal court, 
ethanol and fossil fuel interests challenged CARB’s low carbon fuel 
standards (“LCFS”) on Commerce Clause grounds.  These legal battles are 
addressed in turn. 
i. State Court Challenges
Before CARB could even adopt cap-and-trade regulations to 
implement AB 32, it faced opposition from environmental justice 
organizations in California.  For example, the Association of Irritated 
Residents and a group of other environmental plaintiffs sued CARB over its 
early endorsement of a cap-and-trade program in its 2009 Scoping Plan.53  In 
Irritated Residents, the petitioners alleged that the 2009 Scoping Plan: 
49. Id.
50. Id. at 99.
51. Carbon emissions increased in 2012 largely due to increased natural gas
generation of in-state electricity due to the closure of the San Onofre Nuclear 
Generating Station, a drought year decreasing hydropower generation, and an 11.3% 
population increase over the ten years prior.  See id. at 90. 
52. Id.
53. Assoc. of Irritated Residents v. Cal. Air Res. Bd., 143 Cal. Rptr. 3d 65, 70
(Cal. Ct. App. 2012). 
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(a) [F]ails to achieve the maximum technologically feasible and
cost-effective reductions; (b) fails to require emissions reduction
measures for significant sources of emissions, namely industrial
and agricultural sources; (c) does not develop any policies to
avoid the pitfalls of other greenhouse gas emission trading
programs and fails to address how [C]ARB will monitor and
enforce reductions in a regional market; (d) fails to assess the
likely impacts of proposed policy choices and regulatory
programs and fails to propose policies to ensure that compliance
with chosen measures will not disproportionately impact already
overburdened communities; and (e) fails to prevent increases in
criteria and toxic co-pollutant emissions.  Instead the Scoping
Plan’s analysis acts as a post hoc rationalization for the policy
decisions already chosen by [C]ARB.54
The trial court held that the plan did not violate the requirements of 
AB 32, nor had CARB acted arbitrarily and capriciously in selecting the 
measures it included in the 2009 Scoping Plan.55  Further, the trial court 
rejected almost all of the plaintiffs’ contentions, but did find that CARB had 
failed to adequately analyze alternatives to the cap-and-trade program and 
provided no meaningful discussion about the carbon tax alternative.56  
CARB quickly corrected this mistake and upon doing so, the trial court 
discharged its earlier writ of mandate that prevented further implementation 
of the Scoping Plan.57  Thus, the only issue remaining on appeal was 
whether the Scoping Plan is within the regulatory authorization conferred by 
AB 32.58 
The Court of Appeal employed a deferential standard of review 
because the adoption of the Scoping Plan was a quasi-legislative 
administrative action issued under the broad statutory mandates of AB 32.59  
“If it can be inferred from the authorizing legislation that a [public agency] 
has been granted considerable discretion to determine what is necessary to 
accomplish a valid legislative goal, a more deferential standard of review is 
54. Id. at 71.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 71.
59. Id. (“Because agencies granted such substantial rulemaking power are truly
‘making law,’ their quasi-legislative rules have the dignity of statutes.  When a court 
assesses the validity of such rules, the scope of its review is narrow.  If satisfied that 
the rule in question lay within the lawmaking authority delegated by the Legislature, 
and that it is reasonably necessary to implement the purpose of the statute, judicial 
review is at an end.” (internal citations omitted)). 
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appropriate.”60  In this context, the court rejected the petitioners’ argument 
that CARB had not adopted the maximum reductions required by AB 32. 
The court concluded that: 
It is hardly surprising that the scoping plan leaves some 
questions unanswered and that opinions differ as to many 
complex issues inherent in the task.  After reviewing the record 
before us, we are satisfied that [CARB] has approached its 
difficult task in conformity with the directive from the 
Legislature, and that the measures that it has recommended 
reflect the exercise of sound judgment based upon substantial 
evidence.  Further research and experience likely will suggest 
modifications to the blueprint drawn in the scoping plan, but the 
plan’s adoption in 2009 was in no respect arbitrary or 
capricious.61 
Therefore, AB 32 survived an early challenge because it was a broadly 
worded statute that conferred expansive rulemaking authority to 
implementing agencies.  As the court noted, CARB conducted intensive 
reviews of its recommendations before adopting the 2009 Scoping Plan and 
these reviews also shielded CARB’s regulatory authority.62  The court 
recognized that the Scoping Plan is an iterative process that will develop 
over time, even if CARB had not immediately adopted as many direct 
emission control mechanisms as the plaintiffs sought.63 
Another battle over CARB’s cap-and-trade program was addressed in 
Citizens Climate Lobby v. California Air Resources Board,64 where the petitioners, 
Citizens Climate Lobby and Our Children’s Earth Foundation, challenged 
CARB’s use of standardized additionality mechanisms in the offset 
component of the cap-and-trade program.65  An emission reduction is 
“additional” if it would not have occurred without the financial incentive 
60. Id. at 72 (citing San Francisco Fire Fighters Local 798 v. City & Cnty. of San
Francisco (2006) 38 Cal.4th 653, 670). 
61. Id. at 80.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 75 (“[C]ARB believes, based on the review of emission reduction
opportunities conducted for the scoping plan, that significant reduction 
opportunities exist in the industrial sector that are more readily achieved through 
market mechanisms than through direct measures.” (quoting Appendix C of the 
Scoping Plan)). 
64. Citizens Climate Lobby v. Cal. Air Res. Bd., No. CGC-12-519554, 2013 WL
861396 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 25, 2013). 
65. Id. at *2.
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provided by the offset credit.66  If reductions are not additional, then the 
cap-and-trade program will not reduce greenhouse gas emissions beyond 
what would have occurred anyway.67   
Thus, in order to determine whether a given project applying for an 
offset is additional, CARB needed to determine both the level of emissions 
that would have occurred in the absence of each project and whether the 
project would have occurred in a counterfactual scenario where offset credits 
were not available.68  Naturally, because of the inherent complexity of the 
task before the agency, the court favored a deferential standard of review, 
reminiscent of Irritated Residents.69  First, the court reviewed CARB’s 
standardized additionality regulation de novo and found that the agency acted 
within its legislative grant.70  Then the court applied a highly deferential 
standard in all its other findings.71 
The petitioners in Citizens Climate argued that CARB’s mechanism to 
ensure additionality did not guarantee that reductions would be 
additional.72  The petitioners further contended that CARB adopted circular 
standards to define additionality, as opposed to making the determination 
on a case-by-case basis.73  Ultimately, the court disagreed with the 
petitioners because CARB’s “use of standardized mechanisms [was] 
supported by evidence contained in the administrative record” and AB 32’s 
broad legislative grant did not foreclose standardized additionality 
mechanisms in evaluating offset projects.74 
While this case raised a legitimate issue—that the cap-and-trade 
program’s biggest weakness is verifying that emissions are actually offset—
the court offered support for CARB’s standardized evaluation mechanism.  It 
cited the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism (“CDM”) as 
evidence that a project-by-project approach is ineffective because of its 
66. Id. at *3.
67. Id.
68. Id. at *7.
69. Id. at *11–12.
70. Id. at *10, *15.
71. Id. at *20.
72. Id. at *34.
73. Id.  CARB defined “additional” to mean a reduction is additional if it
exceeds any greenhouse gas reductions that would otherwise occur in a conservative 
business-as-usual scenario.  This was further defined as “the set of conditions 
reasonably expected to occur within the offset project boundary in the absence of the 
financial incentives provided by offset credits.”  Id.  This is a rather circular definition; 
demonstrating the difficulty in actually ensuring that an offset will be “additional.” 
74. Id. at *20.
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administrative complexity, inevitable delay, and cost.75  The court also noted 
that the project-based approach is routinely criticized for being inaccurate, 
despite the fact that it is the most evolved offsetting program in the 
market.76  Before reaching a legal conclusion, the court had essentially 
resolved the case in favor of CARB—with apt justification: 
The earliest national and international cap-and-trade systems 
were created a decade ago and were not fully implemented until 
years later.  The history is short and the practical experience 
limited.  The Legislature delegates authority to agencies to 
promulgate regulations using their best judgment based on the 
currently available information . . . .  It is not within the ambit of 
the Court to decide that one methodology trumps another when 
decisions are made based on extensive research, stakeholder and 
public input, and fact-based analysis.77 
Surviving this challenge was critical for AB 32’s success because 
additionality is the crux of its offset programs.  The appellate court’s 
approval of CARB’s methodology will allow the agency to continue to 
improve its cap-and-trade program and develop better verification 
procedures. 
ii. Federal Court Challenges
AB 32 has survived many legal challenges in federal court as well. 
Most notably, the Rocky Mountain Farmers Union litigation raised 
constitutional questions regarding the LCFS as it applied to ethanol 
producers.78  The LCFS applies to any entity selling transportation fuel in 
California and requires an approximately 10% average reduction in carbon 
intensity of those fuels by 2020.79  In so doing, CARB mandated fuel 
producers to calculate the carbon intensity of, or emissions related to, 
extracting, refining, and transporting the fuel to California (called 
“pathways”).80  Further, producers exceeding the mandated carbon intensity 
75. Id. at *11.
76. Id. at *7.
77. Id. at *11.
78. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2013), cert.
denied, 134 S. Ct. 2884 (2014), and 134 S. Ct. 2875 (2014). 
79. Cal. Exec. Order S-01-07 (Jan.  2007), available at http://www.arb.ca.
gov/fuels/lcfs/eos0107.pdf. 
80. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95481.38 (2015).  While the regulations do not
define the term “pathways,” the Ninth Circuit noted that when CARB assigns a 
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threshold are required to purchase offsets in order to sell their product in 
California.81  This regulation inherently has a materially different impact on 
out-of-state producers than in-state producers.  
The crux of the petitioners’ complaint was that the fuel standard 
discriminates against out-of-state corn ethanol based solely on origin.  The 
petitioners asserted that CARB’s standard treated ethanol differently based 
on origin despite no difference in chemical composition and that CARB’s 
standard furthered no legitimate state purpose.82  The district court applied 
a strict scrutiny standard and, while it reasoned that the LCFS served a 
legitimate state purpose, it ruled that CARB failed to show that its policy 
goals could only be achieved through discriminatory means.83  Essentially, 
the district court concluded that CARB should have excluded from its 
lifecycle analysis geographic-specific factors, such as transportation 
emissions and production emissions (varying due to, e.g., some states 
employment of an RPS while states rely on a coal-heavy generation mix), 
because those factors are “inextricably intertwined with origin.”84  The 
district court also ruled that the fuel standard impermissibly engaged in the 
extraterritorial regulation of ethanol production.85  
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals largely disagreed with the trial 
court and directed it, on remand, to order the plaintiffs to prove that the fuel 
standard “imposes a burden on interstate commerce that is ‘clearly 
excessive’ in relation to its local benefits.”86  It noted first that if California is 
to assign different carbon intensities to ethanol from different regions, there 
must be “some reason, apart from their origin, to treat them differently.”87  A 
regulation is not facially discriminatory simply because it affects in-state 
and out-of-state interests unequally.88  The court reasoned that even though 
all greenhouse gases mix in the atmosphere and “climate change risks are 
widely shared,” California’s interest in reducing them is not thereby 
lessened.89  Moreover, the court recognized that the LCFS uses a lifecycle 
analysis to measure the carbon intensity of all fuel pathways and considers 
cumulative carbon intensity value to the lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions of a fuel, 
it refers to them as “pathways.”  Rocky Mountain Farmers Union, 730 F.3d at 1081. 
81. Id. at 1080.
82. Id. at 1077–78.
83. Id. at 1078.
84. Id. at 1088–89.
85. Id. at 1077–78.
86. Id. at 1078 (citing Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970)).
87. Id. at 1089 (quoting Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 627 (1978)).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1080–81 (citing Massachusetts v. E.P.A., 549 U.S. 497, 522 (2007)).
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geography only to the extent that it affects the actual emissions attributable 
to a pathway90: 
[I]f producers of out-of-state ethanol actually cause more GHG
emissions for each unit produced, because they use dirtier
electricity or less efficient plants, CARB can base its regulatory
treatment on these emissions.  If California is to successfully
promote low-carbon-intensity fuels, countering a trend towards
increased GHG output and rising world temperatures, it cannot
ignore the real factors behind GHG emissions.91
Thus, the court held that California is “entitled to proceed” on the 
understanding that global warming is induced by rising carbon emissions 
because “if [California] is to have any chance to curtail GHG emissions, [it] 
must be able to consider all factors that cause those emissions when it 
assesses alternative fuels.”92  Accordingly, the Commerce Clause did not 
require California to ignore the “real differences in carbon intensity among 
out-of-state ethanol pathways . . . .  These factors are not discriminatory 
because they reflect the reality of assessing and attempting to limit GHG 
emissions from ethanol production.”93 
The Vessel Fuel Rules are another aspect of AB 32 that was opposed in 
federal court.  In Pacific Merchant Shipping Association v. Goldstene, the Vessel Fuel 
Rules survived Commerce Clause and field preemption challenges.94  These 
rules mandated that vessel operators “use cleaner marine fuels in diesel and 
diesel-electric engines, propulsion engines, and auxiliary boilers” when they 
“operat[e] within twenty-four nautical miles off the California coastline.”95  
These rules would affect several global shipping fleets.  For example, 
collectively, the ports of Long Beach and Los Angeles constitute the largest 
port in the United States, with over 40% of all national imports entering the 
country through these ports.96 
Ocean-going vessels frequenting California ports are a leading source 
of air pollution in the state due to their widespread use of low-grade bunker 
fuel.97  This fuel contains an average of approximately 25,000 parts per 
million (“ppm”) of sulfur, along with nitrous oxide compounds and carbon 
90. Id. at 1089.
91. Id. at 1090.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1093.
94. Pac. Merch. Shipping Ass’n v. Goldstene, 639 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2011).
95. CAL. CODE. REGS. tit. 13 §2299.2(b)(F) (2015).
96. Pac. Merch. Shipping Ass’n, 639 F.3d at 1159.
97. Id.
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dioxide.98  Comparatively, the diesel fuel used by trucks and other motor 
vehicles emit on average just 15 ppm of sulfur.99  Moreover, California ports 
were ripe for more stringent atmospheric pollutant control because 80% of 
the state’s population is exposed to the emissions from oceangoing 
vessels.100   
From an economic perspective, addressing this issue would have 
minimal impact on the American consumer.  CARB estimated that 
compliance with the rules would result in approximately a six-dollar 
increase per twenty-foot shipping container; or in other words, an extra 12.5 
cents in the cost of a plasma television or an additional 0.14 cents for a pair 
of athletic shoes.101  Nonetheless, the plaintiff, the Pacific Merchant 
Shipping Association (“PMSA”), sought a declaration that, insofar as the 
rules regulate “conduct seaward of California’s three-mile boundary,” the 
Submerged Lands Act and the Commerce Clause preempt CARB’s 
authority.102 
Through the Submerged Lands Act, the United States “released to the 
coastal States its rights in the submerged lands within stated limits and 
confirmed its own rights therein seaward of those limits.”103  Thus, coastal 
states were granted exclusive title, subject to foreign commerce, navigation, 
national defense, and foreign affairs regulation by the federal government104 
up to three miles seaward of their shorelines to the lands and natural 
resources beneath navigable waters.105  PMSA argued that not only is the 
federal interest in regulating the waters above these lands so exclusive as to 
overrule state jurisdiction, but also that CARB’s rules assert the territorial 
dominion of California twenty-four miles seaward, even though the Act 
defined a state’s boundary at three miles seaward.106  In other words, PMSA 
argued that CARB’s rules operate in fields historically operated by the 
98. Id. (citing CARB studies from 2006).
99. Id. at 1160 (citing CARB studies from 2006).
100. Id. (“Vessel emissions constitute the single largest source of [sulfur oxide]
emissions in the state, responsible for 40% of all such emissions.  Furthermore, both 
NOx and SOx are precursors to fine particulate matter pollution (“PM 2.5”).  It was 
estimated that the vessels’ daily PM emissions represent the equivalent of 
approximately 150,000 big rig trucks traveling 125 miles per day . . . emissions are 
likely to be blown on-shore from beyond the geographical area actually covered by 
the [rules].” (citing CARB studies from 2006)). 
101. Id. at 1176.
102. Id. at 1161.
103. United States v. Louisiana, 446 U.S. 253, 256 (1980).
104. 43 U.S.C. § 1314(a) (2011).
105. Pac. Merch. Shipping Ass’n, 639 F.3d at 1164.
106. Id. at 1165.
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federal government, e.g., maritime commerce, conduct at sea outside of 
state boundaries, and the definition of state boundaries.107  Unfortunately 
for PMSA, the court applied the “well established” presumption against 
preemption in this field due to the “historic presence of state law” in the 
area of air pollution.108 
First, the court stated that the Submerged Lands Act expressly reserves 
concurrent jurisdiction over the waters within this belt for the federal uses 
discussed above.109  The court then went on to cite precedent from the 
Supreme Court110 and several coastal state supreme courts111 to 
demonstrate that federal law, including the Submerged Lands Act, does not 
preempt CARB in this field.  For example, the court cited Huron Portland 
Cement Company v. City of Detroit, Michigan, where the Supreme Court “refused 
to bar the prosecution of a ship owner for violating a municipal smoke 
abatement provision when its vessels were docked at the city’s port even 
though ‘[s]tructural alterations would be required in order to insure 
compliance.’”112  The court in Huron Portland Cement Company also added, 
“[l]egislation designed to free from pollution the very air that people breathe 
clearly falls within the exercise of even the most traditional concept of what 
is compendiously known as the police power.”113  Thus, the district court’s 
denial of PMSA’s motion for summary judgment, as to its claim of implicit 
field preemption under the Act, was affirmed.114 
Moving to the Commerce Clause argument, the court cited the two 
broad categories of state regulations that burden interstate commerce: 
(1) those whose central purpose is to regulate interstate commerce or
otherwise discriminate against out-of-state interests; and (2) those that
incidentally burden commerce.115  Regulations that regulate interstate
commerce or discriminate against out of state interests are generally struck
107. Id.at 1166.
108. Id. at 1167.
109. Id. at 1168.
110. See, e.g., United States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699, 705 (1950); Skiriotes v.
Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 77 (1941). 
111. See e.g., State v. Stepansky, 761 So.2d 1027, 1029–37 (Fla. 2000); State v.
Jack, 125 P.3d 311 (Alaska 2005) (following Stepansky); People v. Weeren, 607 P.2d 
1279, 1281–88 (1980). 
112. Pac. Merch. Shipping Ass’n, 639 F.3d at 1171 (quoting Huron Portland
Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, Mich., 362 U.S. 440, 441 (1960). 
113. Id. at 1167 (quoting Huron Portland Cement, 362 U.S. at 442).
114. Id. at 1176.
115. Id. at 1177.
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down.116  Regulations that incidentally burden commerce are reviewed under 
a balancing test, where courts will determine if the burden of the imposed 
regulations outweigh their putative benefits and render the regulations 
unreasonable or irrational.117  Moreover, state legislation regulating 
commerce that takes place wholly outside of the state’s borders is 
forbidden.118  However, “the general rule on preemption in admiralty is that 
states may supplement federal admiralty law as applied to matters of local 
concern, so long as state law does not actually conflict with federal law or 
interfere with the uniform working of the maritime legal system.”119  Working in 
this framework, the court held that the rules do not conflict with either the 
Commerce Clause or the fundamental principles of maritime law.120 
First, the rules do not directly regulate interstate commerce because 
“the central purpose of the Vessel Fuel Rules is to protect the health and 
well-being of the State’s residents from the harmful effects of the fuel used 
by ocean-going vessels.”121  Moreover, the rules do not apply to commercial 
activities occurring wholly outside the territorial limits of California.122  
Secondly, because the rules imposed a relatively light burden on interstate 
commerce, the court was permitted to balance the putative environmental 
benefits from regulating the carbon intensity of vessel fuels against the 
increased cost on vessels frequenting California ports.123  The court 
concluded that “the exceptionally powerful state interest at issue here far 
outweighs any countervailing federal interests.”124 
In sum, AB 32 and its implementing regulation, the Scoping Plan, has 
repeatedly withstood legal confrontations in its brief history in both state 
and federal court.  While the specter of explicit federal preemption remains 
until Congress speaks on climate change, AB 32 has survived multiple 
constitutional challenges.  Moreover, California courts have approved the 
main components of the Scoping Plan as well as CARB’s regulatory 
jurisdiction under AB 32.  CARB’s experience regulating in this field has 
therefore been proven to rest on stable statutory and constitutional 
authority.  California’s successes, as well as those in Massachusetts, are a 
116. See, e.g., Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth.,
476 U.S. 573, 579 (1986); Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978). 
117. Pac. Merch. Shipping Ass’n, 639 F.3d at 1177.
118. Id. at 1178.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1179.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1181.
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guide for other states who are trying to design a climate change law that will 
survive the inevitable legal challenges.125 
III. Massachusetts
This section will examine the policy tools Massachusetts implemented
within its borders to address climate change and the legal barriers the 
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (“RGGI”) has faced as a prima facie 
regulation of the interstate market for carbon emissions.126 
A. Massachusetts’ GWSA and Clean Energy and Climate Plan
for 2020
Massachusetts’ Global Warming Solutions Act was codified as the 
Climate Protection and Green Economy Act127 and it directed state agencies 
to achieve 10% to 25% statewide greenhouse gas emission reduction below 
1990 levels by 2020.128  The statute directed the Executive Office of Energy 
and Environmental Affairs (“EEA”), in consultation with other agencies, to 
establish regulations requiring reporting of greenhouse gas emissions,129 a 
baseline assessment for 1990 emissions and a 2020 business as usual 
scenario,130 and target emission reductions that must be achieved by 
2020.131  The agency was required to issue an action plan and regulations 
implementing these mandates.132 
In late December 2010, pursuant to the legislature’s direction, EEA 
released its Clean Energy and Climate Plan for 2020.133  Somewhat 
125. See infra Part B.2.
126. The states participating in this program are Massachusetts, Connecticut,
Delaware, Maine, Maryland, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont. 
See REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, http://www.rggi.org/ (last visited Feb. 9, 2014).  
127. An Act Establishing The Global Warming Solutions Act, ch. 298, 2008
Mass. Acts 1154 (codified at Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 21N (2013)). 
128. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 21N, § 3(b) (2013) (“The secretary shall . . . adopt the
following statewide greenhouse gas emissions limits: (1) a 2020 statewide emissions 
limit and a plan to achieve that limit pursuant to section 4 . . . .”); id. at § 4(a) (“The 
secretary shall adopt the 2020 statewide greenhouse gas emissions limit pursuant to 
subsection (b) of section 3 which shall be between 10 per cent and 25 per cent below 
the 1990 emissions level and a plan for achieving said reduction.”). 
129. Id. at § 5.
130. Id. at §§ 3(b); 4(a).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Mass. Exec. Office of Energy and Envtl. Affairs, Patrick-Murray
Administration Announces Energy and Climate Plan to Reduce Greenhouse Gas 
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differently than California, a state that has a wealth of natural resources that 
will be directly impacted by climate change, Massachusetts framed its 
climate plan largely in economic terms.  First, the EEA noted that the state 
imports over twenty-two billion dollars in fossil fuel resources—money that 
could remain in the state.134  Moreover, EEA estimated that state 
employment in the energy efficiency sector rose 65% between 2007 and 
2010; highlighting a market bolstered by climate-conscious policy.135  After 
discussing the excellent economic opportunity before the commonwealth,136 
the EEA addressed the hazardous environmental impacts global warming 
will have on Massachusetts’ climate, further demonstrating the impetus for 
the commonwealth’s action.137 
EEA’s plan employs an “integrated portfolio of policies” that is divided 
into five categories where new climate change regulation can be integrated 
with existing policy to reduce emissions138: buildings, electricity supply, 
transportation, non-energy emissions, and cross-cutting policies.139  While 
EEA’s emission reduction goal is at 18%, ideally, it is estimating a roughly 
Emissions by 25 percent by 2020 (Dec. 29, 2010), http://www.mass.gov/eea/pr-pre-
p2/pr-2010/press-release-re-clean-energy-and-climate-plan.html.  
134. IAN A. BOWELS, MASS. EXEC. OFFICE OF ENERGY AND ENVTL. AFFAIRS, 
MASSACHUSETTS CLEAN ENERGY AND CLIMATE PLAN FOR 2020, at 2 (2010), available at 
http://www.mass.gov/eea/docs/eea/energy/2020-clean-energy-plan.pdf [hereinafter 
Mass. 2020 Clean Energy & Climate Plan] (“All of [Massachusetts’] fossil-based 
energy resources—oil, natural gas, and coal—are derived from other regions of the 
country . . . and other parts of the world, many of them unstable or hostile to the 
United States . . . all spending on fossil fuel energy . . . flows out of state and fails to 
provide income to in-state businesses or employees.”). 
135. Id. at 1 (“Massachusetts launched the most aggressive energy efficiency
program in the country, with estimated savings of over $6 billion for residential, 
municipal, industrial, and commercial customers and 4,500 jobs projected.”); id. 
(“Between 2007 and the end of 2010 . . . jobs in solar manufacturing, installation, and 
services [tripled] – while installed wind energy increased 10-fold.”). 
136. Id. at 5–6 (“Through both direct and indirect impacts, we estimate that
these policies will create 36,000 jobs in Massachusetts in 2020, including about 
13,000 via transportation policies and 23,000 via policies to improve efficiency of 
energy use in buildings.”). 
137. Id. at 9–11 (e.g., summer temperatures would “feel like the current
summer climate of the Carolinas,” rainfall would increase by 12% to 30%, coastal 
lands would be subject to increased erosion, and the possibility of an outbreak of a 
water-borne disease would also increase.). 
138. Id. at 13.
139. Id. at 80.
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27% emission reduction by 2020, procured from the aforementioned 
sectors.140   
1. Buildings
Buildings are of particular focus for Massachusetts because they 
consume over 50% of the energy used in the commonwealth, primarily from 
natural gas heating and heating oils, as well as from electricity for air 
conditioning, lighting, ventilation, appliances, and industrial equipment.141  
To achieve reductions in this arena, EEA proposed performance based 
energy codes to incentivize energy efficiency in new construction,142 as well 
as “deep” building retrofitting.143  In addition, EEA proposed eventual wide-
scale adoption of “residential building energy labeling that allows apples-to-
apples comparisons of home energy performance in much the same way 
that miles per gallon (“MPG”) ratings allow fuel efficiency comparisons of 
cars and light trucks.”144  The EEA also included a policy framework for solar 
thermal water and space heating in both residential and commercial 
buildings.145 
2. Electricity Supply
EEA’s policy proposals in the electricity supply sector sought to build 
on the existing RPS146 and the commonwealth’s participation in RGGI147 by 
implementing stricter power plant rules, increasing hydroelectric energy 
140. EEA estimates that of the approximately 27% in emission reductions,
9.8% will come from buildings, 7.7% from electricity supply, 7.6% from transportation, 
and 2% from non-energy sources.  Id. at 92. 
141. Id. at 14.
142. Id. at 23.
143. Id. at 26 (e.g., rebates for retrofits with higher levels of insulation, air
leakage reduction, and thermally efficient windows). 
144. Id. at 16.
145. Id. at 29 (“Hot water and space heating are large energy users that do not
require very high grade fuels (unlike motor vehicles for example).  This makes them 
excellent candidates for active solar heating, which has no fuel expense and can 
provide significant heating from a small roof, wall or ground-mounted system.”). 
146. Id. at 40 (“Over the period from 2010 to 2020, the Massachusetts RPS
classes will stimulate $360 million annual investment, or $3.9 billion in cumulative 
investment in clean power generation that would not have occurred on its own.  This 
is expected to create approximately 900 full-time construction jobs throughout that 
period.”). 
147. Id. at 42 (“Over $120 million in auction proceeds has been invested in
energy efficiency projects across [Massachusetts] since 2009 . . . .”). 
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imports from Canada, and establishing a clean energy performance standard 
(“CPS”).148  Massachusetts expects to bring its older coal-fired power plants 
offline in response to EPA’s more stringent power plant rules.149  EEA 
estimates that Massachusetts could achieve a net reduction of 1.2 million 
metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent150 in 2020 if two of its aging coal 
plants were replaced by natural gas-fired power plants.151  The CPS is a 
proposed “market-based framework” that incentivizes performance 
standards of power plants supplying Massachusetts’ electricity.152  In order 
to do so, EEA proposes a doubling of hydroelectric power imports, 
increasing capacity from regional nuclear plants, and stimulating power 
generation technology evolution.153 
3. Transportation
In the transportation sector, Massachusetts will improve vehicle 
efficiency, reduce vehicle miles traveled, and bolster the commonwealth’s 
existing policy to reduce the carbon intensity of vehicle fuel sold in the 
commonwealth.154  Currently, Massachusetts is in conformance with EPA’s 
27.5-MPG standard and expects to reach the 35.5-MPG goal by 2016. 
Moreover, Massachusetts will adopt California’s MPG and greenhouse gas 
emission standards for vehicle fuels (expected to be more stringent than the 
federal standard) when they are implemented for model 2017 to 2020 
vehicles.155  In conjunction with the Clean Energy Biofuels Act, the EEA 
plans on implementing an LCFS similar to California’s standards.156  To 
reduce the amount of vehicle miles traveled, Massachusetts is piloting a 
“pay as you drive” automobile insurance program that converts a large fixed 
annual premium into a variable cost based on miles traveled.157  With 
transportation expected to account for about 40% of total greenhouse gas 
148. Id. at 38–39.
149. Id. at 44.
150. Carbon dioxide equivalent, or “CO2e,” is defined as “the amount of carbon
dioxide by weight that would produce the same global warming impact as a given weight 
of another greenhouse gas . . . .”  CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38505(c) (West 2014). 
151. Mass. 2020 Clean Energy & Climate Plan, supra note 134, at 44.
152. Id. at 47 (“[CPS] applies an output-based performance standard to either
portfolios of retail electricity sellers or to generators in terms of tons of pollution per 
megawatt-hour of electricity.”). 
153. Id.
154. Id. at 49–51.
155. Id. at 53.
156. Id. at 57.
157. Id. at 61.
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emissions in Massachusetts by 2020, EEA is confident that incentivizing a 
reduction in vehicle miles traveled will result in extensive economic158 and 
public health benefits.159  EEA also proposed to reduce sprawl and promote 
“smart growth”160 by highlighting the need to coordinate transportation 
infrastructure and land use planning.161 
4. Non-Energy Emissions
The non-energy emissions sector accounts for roughly 7% of 
Massachusetts’ greenhouse gas emissions.  To curb these largely industrial 
pollutants, EEA proposed finding substitutes for high global warming 
potential refrigerants and emission reduction from disposal of plastic 
waste.162  EEA is particularly concerned about refrigerants used in motor 
vehicle air conditioning and industrial sources, as well as the need to retrofit 
these sources of greenhouse emissions to reduce leakage.163  Additionally, 
EEA estimates that diversion of plastic from the waste stream into recycled 
goods will yield cumulative savings between sixty-nine and ninety-two 
million dollars from 2009 to 2020 while cutting emissions generated by 
plastic disposal.164 
5. Cross-Cutting Policies
Finally, EEA is developing a plan to implement its statutory mandate 
to “consider reasonably foreseeable climate change impacts, including 
additional [greenhouse] gas emissions” when reviewing and issuing permits, 
158. Id. at 62 (“A nationwide study by the Brookings Institution found that [pay
as you drive] insurance would reduce [vehicle miles traveled] by [eight] percent.”). 
An 8% reduction in vehicle miles traveled would result in nearly 2% reduction of 
statewide greenhouse gas emissions by 2020.  Id.  
159. Id. (“In the middle policy option, there would be an estimate reduction in
crashes of 11,000, 7,000 fewer injuries, and 36 fewer fatalities, yielding $420 million 
in total benefits, part of which would accrue to drivers in lower insurance rates.”). 
160. “Smart growth” is compact mixed-use development that focuses on
increased population density, building efficiency, and reducing vehicle miles 
traveled.  Id. at 68. 
161. Id. (“Large transportation cost reductions can be expected for residents
and business due to reduced vehicle ownership and fuel consumption.  High-density 
mixed-use development will increase building efficiency and make district energy 
and combined heat and power more feasible.”). 
162. Id. at 71–72.
163. Id. at 73–76.
164. Id. at 79.
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licenses, and other administrative approvals or decisions.165  This “cross-
cutting” policy will expand the Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act166 
and embed climate change adaptation into municipal planning.167  
Moreover, EEA will also expand Massachusetts’ existing “Leading by 
Example” program that “works to lower costs and reduce environmental 
impacts” of all executive agencies, quasi-public authorities, and the twenty-
nine public institutions of higher education in the commonwealth.168 
In sum, Massachusetts’ multi-sector approach resembles CARB’s 
Scoping Plan in many ways.  Both plans are governed by short and broadly 
written statutes that empower state agencies to make expansive rules that 
have far-reaching economic impacts.  Moreover, both states recognize the 
dire need to restrict carbon emissions from their energy and transportation 
industries.  However, Massachusetts frames its climate action plan in more 
explicit economic terms than California and often emphasizes the 
employment opportunities that EEA’s plans will create.  Regardless of their 
differences, both plans serve as models for other states. 
B. Other Laws Addressing Global Warming in Massachusetts
1. Clean Energy Biofuels Act of 2008
Biofuels are substitutes for fossil fuels and are derived from organic 
matter such as corn, soy, switchgrass, agricultural waste, wood, and waste 
vegetable oil.169  Cellulosic biofuels refer to gasoline substitutes made from 
the fibrous matter of feedstocks (i.e., cellulose, hemicellulose, or lignin).170  
The advantages of cellulosic biofuels over fossil fuels become apparent upon 
analyzing the lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions of both fuels.  Under the Act, 
these emissions are an aggregate of direct and “significant” indirect 
emissions, which relate to feedstock generation, extraction, distribution, and 
delivery where the mass values of all greenhouse gas emissions therefrom are 
adjusted to account for their relative global warming potential.171   
165. Id. at 87 (see Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 21N, § 7 (2013)).
166. Id. at 81.
167. Id. at 85–86.
168. Id. at 83 (Dec. 29, 2010).
169. Ken Kimmel & Laurie Burt, Massachusetts Takes on Climate Change, 27 UCLA J. 
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 295, 307 (2009). 
170. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 64A, § 1 (2013).
171. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 64A, § 1 (“‘Lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions’ [are]
the aggregate quantity of greenhouse gas emissions, including direct emissions and 
significant indirect emissions such as significant emissions from and use changes, as 
determined by the department in consultation with the department of environmental 
protection and the executive office of energy and environmental affairs, related to the 
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While replacing fossil fuels with bioenergy does not by itself reduce 
carbon emissions, biofuels can produce net climate benefits when the 
feedstock captures more carbon while it is growing than would otherwise be 
captured.172  To take advantage of these benefits, Massachusetts defined 
“eligible cellulosic biofuel” as one that “yields at least a 60 per cent lifecycle 
greenhouse gas emissions relative to the average lifecycle greenhouse gas 
emissions petroleum based fuel sold in 2005.”173  In doing so, Massachusetts 
was the first state in the country to give preferential tax treatment to 
companies that develop gasoline substitutes from the cellulosic matter of 
feedstocks to support non-corn-based ethanol fuels.174 
Through this legislation, Massachusetts also adopted a LCFS—one that 
was in exact conformity with California’s standard.  Under the Act, a LCFS is 
defined as “a legal requirement that the average lifecycle greenhouse gas 
emissions attributable to use of energy in an economic sector are equal to or 
below a specified numeric level . . . such as the requirement contained in 
California Executive Order S-1-07.”175  The Act also directed EEA to develop 
and enter into (“to the extent possible”) an agreement with RGGI states that 
implements a region-wide LCFS.176   
Ultimately, the commonwealth is primarily relying on the development 
of a LCFS, supported by cellulosic biofuel, to obtain reductions in one of its 
biggest sources of greenhouse gas emissions—the transportation sector.177  
The Clean Energy Biofuels Act gave EEA statutory authority to include a LCFS 
full fuel lifecycle, including all stages of fuel and feedstock production and 
distribution, from feedstock generation or extraction through the distribution and 
delivery and use of the finished fuel to the ultimate consumer, where the mass 
values for all greenhouse gases are adjusted to account for their relative global 
warming potential.”). 
172. Timothy D. Searchinger et al., Fixing a Critical Climate Accounting Error, 326
SCI. 527, 528 (2009) (“Bioenergy . . . reduces greenhouse emissions only if the growth 
and harvesting of the biomass for energy captures carbon above and beyond what 
would be sequestered anyway and thereby offsets emissions from energy use.”). 
173. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 64A, § 1.  Similarly, the federal government also
takes these net lifecycle emissions benefits into account and defines “advanced” 
biofuels in the Clean Air Act as a “renewable fuel, other than ethanol derived from 
corn starch, that has lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions . . . that are at least 50 
percent less than baseline lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions [of fossil fuels].”  See 
42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(B)(i) (2012). 
174. Kimmel & Burt, supra note 169.
175. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 94, § 295G1/2(1) (2013).
176. An Act Relative to Clean Energy Biofuels, ch. 206, 2008 Mass. Acts 968.
177. See Mass. 2020 Clean Energy & Climate Plan, supra note 134, at 52.
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that favors cellulosic biofuels in the commonwealth’s Clean Energy Plan.178  
Moreover, the Act allows Massachusetts to fulfill the federal government’s 
renewable fuel and cellulosic biofuel directives.179  Thus, the Act is integral to 
the transportation component of Massachusetts’ overall climate change 
regulation framework.   
2. Green Jobs Act of 2008
Massachusetts passed the Green Jobs Act in 2008 to directly capitalize 
on the economic opportunity created by addressing climate change. 180  One 
of the goals of the statute was to promote job creation in the clean energy 
sector,181 specifically jobs in energy efficiency.182  The commonwealth had 
good reason to do so as well; according to a University of Massachusetts, 
Amherst study,183 clean energy spending produces more jobs at all pay 
levels than the fossil fuel industry.184  In order to actually create those jobs, 
however, the commonwealth needed to attract green business to 
Massachusetts, as well as train its existing workforce to serve this 
burgeoning industry.  
Accordingly, the Act established the Massachusetts Clean Energy 
Technology Center185 (“Center”) to serve as the commonwealth’s lead 
regulatory agency in fostering the clean energy economy.186  To assist in 
financing the Center, the Green Jobs Act also established the Massachusetts 
178. See id. at 51.
179. See id. at 51–52.
180. An Act Relative to Green Jobs in the Commonwealth, ch. 307, 2008 Mass.
Acts 1371. 
181. Id.
182. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 23J, § 1 (2013); see also Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 23J, §§
2(a)(i)–(xi) (“The [Massachusetts Clean Energy Center] shall promote and advance 
the commonwealth’s public interests by: (i) acting as the commonwealth’s lead 
agency . . . in the promotion and development of jobs in the clean energy sector . . . 
(iii) stimulating the creation and development of new clean energy ventures that will
form the foundation of a strong clean energy industry sector or cluster in the
commonwealth . . . .”).
183. Prepared under commission from the Natural Resources Defense Council
and Green for All. 
184. ROBERT POLLIN ET AL., DEP’T OF ECON. & POLITICAL ECON. RESEARCH INST., UNIV.
OF MASS., AMHERST, GREEN PROSPERITY: HOW CLEAN-ENERGY CAN FIGHT POVERTY AND RAISE
LIVING STANDARDS IN THE UNITED STATES 10, 12 (2009), available at http://docs.nrdc.org/ 
globalWarming/files/glo_09062504a.pdf. 
185. A department under EEA.  See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 23J, § 2(a).
186. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 23J, § 2(a).
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Alternative and Clean Energy Investment Trust Fund (“Fund”).187  Moreover, 
the Center has regulatory authority to enter into agreements with public or 
private clean energy entities to further research and development in clean 
energy jobs, aid in the promotion of environmental protection, and 
collaborate with government and business to foster clean energy 
investment.188  As of 2014, the Center has invested nine million dollars into 
the sixteen companies in its portfolio, which have raised a total of $535 
million in additional investment from private sources.189   
Generally, the Center has been successful in bringing investment 
dollars and jobs to Massachusetts’ clean energy sector.  For example, clean 
energy businesses in Massachusetts have added a total of 28,000 workers to 
their payrolls since 2010—a 47% increase.190  Over 1,000 new businesses 
were established in Massachusetts’ clean energy sector between 2011 and 
2014.191  Clean energy employment statewide grew over 10% between 2013 
and 2014.192  Renewable energy workers account for nearly 21,000 jobs in 
Massachusetts and employers expect to add about 3,800 new employees 
between 2014 and 2015—representing the fastest growth rate of any 
technology area in the commonwealth at a rate of 18%.193  Furthermore, 
Massachusetts predicted it would add renewable energy jobs at a rate of 
13.3% from 2014 to 2015.194  In comparison, statewide overall job growth 
187. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 10, § 35FF(a) (2013); see also Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 10, §
35FF(c) (the fund shall advance the following public purposes: “(1) to stimulate 
increased financing for the expansion of state-of-the-art clean energy research and 
development facilities by leveraging private financing and providing financing related 
thereto including, without limitation, financing for the construction or expansion of 
such facilities; (2) to provide grants to state educational institutions to develop a 
curriculum relative to clean energy and clean energy technology; (3) to make targeted 
investments in clean energy research and to promote manufacturing activities for 
new or existing advanced clean energy technologies; (4) to make matching grants to 
universities, colleges, public instrumentalities, companies and other entities to 
induce the federal government, industry and other grant-funding sources to fund the 
expansion of research and development in clean energy”). 
188. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 23J, § 3(a)(14).  For a full description of the Center’s
authority, see id. at §§ 3(a)(1)–(30). 
189. MASS. CLEAN ENERGY CTR., MASSACHUSETTS CLEAN ENERGY INDUSTRY REPORT
2014, at 38 (2014), available at http://images.masscec.com/reports/Web%20Optimized% 
202014%20Report%20Final.pdf. 
190. Id. at 1.
191. Id. at 24.
192. Id. at 25.
193. Id. at 14.
194. Id. at 1.
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projections in the same period are less than 2%.195  This growth is derived 
primarily from the energy efficiency, renewable energy, and associated 
financial and legal service industries.196 
The Green Jobs Act has proven fruitful in demonstrating the viability of 
environmentally conscious economic policies.  Even in the face of 
diminished federal subsidies, the renewable energy and energy efficiency 
markets continue to flourish in Massachusetts.  Preparing its workforce for a 
transition to a clean energy economy will prove critical for Massachusetts. 
While the rest of the national economy undergoes the same transition, 
Massachusetts’ economy will be primed to accommodate green business 
and its policymakers will understand what approaches are most effective at 
both addressing climate change and driving economic growth. 
3. The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative
RGGI is a regional cap-and-trade program administered by nine 
Northeastern and Mid-Atlantic states, including Massachusetts.  RGGI’s 
“CO2 Budget Trading Program” sets a decreasing carbon emission cap and 
regulates emissions from fossil fuel power plants with a capacity of twenty-
five megawatts or greater located in RGGI states.197  The current 
programmatic emissions budget is ninety-one million tons of carbon 
dioxide, divided among each state in rough proportion to emitting 
sources.198   
Each state issues carbon allowances through their own RGGI 
implementing regulations.199  Massachusetts has twenty-seven regulated 
sources, constituting 16% of RGGI’s carbon dioxide budget.200  Similar to 
California’s cap-and-trade system, Massachusetts and the other RGGI states 
rely on category-specific, or standardized, additionality measurements. 
Currently, there are five categories of offsetting projects that are eligible 
195. Id.
196. Id. at 13–14.
197. REG’L GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, OVERVIEW OF RGGI CO2 BUDGET TRADING 
PROGRAM 2 (2007), http://www.rggi.org/docs/program_summary_10_07.pdf. 
198. Reg’l Greenhouse Gas Initiative, RGGI States Make Major Cuts to
Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Power Plants (Jan. 13, 2014), http://www.rggi.org/ 
docs/PressReleases/PR011314_AuctionNotice23.pdf. 
199. Regulated Sources, RGGI.ORG (last visited Feb. 10, 2014), http://www.rggi.org/
design/overview/regulated_sources.  Massachusetts’ regulations implementing RGGI 
are found at 225 MASS. CODE. REGS. §13.01 (2013) et seq. and 310 MASS. CODE. REGS. § 
7.00 (2013) et seq. 
200. REG’L GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, RGGI REGION – STATE SNAPSHOTS,
http://www.rggi.org/docs/RGGI_Snapshots_Region.pdf. 
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allowances under RGGI, for example, carbon sequestration in American 
forest preservation projects.201   
Offset allowances are distributed through quarterly auctions.202  They 
are tracked using an online platform that enables the public to view and 
download reports of program data and allowance activity.203  Allowances are 
allocated and transferred on the platform and offset projects can be 
registered on it as well.204  The largely positive first RGGI program review was 
published on February 7, 2013, and concluded that there were several 
opportunities to build on RGGI’s success.205  However, despite RGGI’s 
largely positive beginnings, constitutional questions still linger around the 
regional cap-and-trade program.  The following section examines possible 
constitutional issues that several legal scholars have raised in the years 
following RGGI’s enactment. 
i. Compact Clause Challenges
Under the Compact Clause in Article I of the Constitution, “no state 
shall, without the consent of Congress . . . enter into any agreement or 
compact with any other state . . . .”  Interpreting this language literally, RGGI 
is an unconstitutional agreement among the states because they never 
sought congressional approval.  However, the Supreme Court has 
interpreted the clause differently than the literal language of the 
provision.206  The clause is now read to prohibit “the formation of any 
combination tending to increase the political power in the states, which may 
encroach upon or interfere with the just supremacy of the United States.”207  
201. REG’L GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, FACT SHEET: RGGI OFFSETS,
http://www.rggi.org/docs/Documents/RGGI_Offsets_FactSheet.pdf.  Other eligible 
offsetting projects include landfill methane capture and destruction, reduction in 
emissions of sulfur hexafluoride in the electric power sector, reduction or avoidance 
of end-use combustion of fossil fuels due to increased energy efficiency in the 
building sector, and avoided methane emissions from agricultural manure 
management operations. 
202. REG’L GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, FACT SHEET: RGGI CO2 ALLOWANCE 
AUCTIONS, http://www.rggi.org/docs/Documents/RGGI_Auctions_FactSheet.pdf.  
203. REG’L GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, FACT SHEET: RGGI CO2 ALLOWANCE 
TRACKING SYSTEM, http://www.rggi.org/docs/Documents/RGGI_COATS_FactSheet.pdf.   
204. Id.
205. Reg’l Greenhouse Gas Initiative, RGGI States Propose Lowering Regional
CO2 Emissions Cap 45% (Feb. 7, 2013), http://www.rggi.org/docs/PressReleases/ 
PR130207_ModelRule.pdf.  
206. See generally Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503 (1893).
207. Id. at 519.
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In other words, agreements that do not encroach upon federal sovereignty 
do not require Congressional consent.208 
One scholar recently considered and dismissed the possibility of a 
viable Compact Clause challenge to RGGI.209  Applying Virginia v. Tennessee to 
RGGI, Professor Funk noted, “RGGI does not limit the federal government’s 
authority to regulate [carbon dioxide] in any way it sees fit.”210  Moreover, no 
state has delegated any of its sovereign powers to RGGI, Inc., the 
administrative body that implements each states’ respective RGGI laws.211  
In fact, all of RGGI’s powers stem solely from individual states’ laws, which 
are “nothing more than reciprocal legislation” with no capacity to bind other 
member states.212  RGGI only limits greenhouse gas emissions of electricity 
generators within each member states’ borders and does not interfere with 
any existing federal regulatory scheme.  Professor Funk concluded: “It 
appears that the Compact Clause, like the Non-Delegation Doctrine, has 
become a restriction in theory, but in practice the restriction rarely 
applies.”213  Thus, in light of RGGI’s inability to legally bind its constituents, 
the member states would likely withstand a Compact Clause challenge. 
ii. Federal Preemption Challenges
RGGI may be subject to two possible preemption arguments: field and 
conflict preemption.  The Supreme Court has articulated that field 
preemption exists when: 
[I]n the absence of explicit statutory language, state law . . .
regulates conduct in a field that Congress intended the Federal
Government to occupy exclusively.  Such an intent may be
inferred from a “scheme of federal regulation . . . so pervasive as
to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for
the States to supplement it,” or where an Act of Congress
“touch[es] a field in which the federal interest is so dominant
208. Ne. Bancorp, Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 472 U.S.
159, 175 (1985). 
209. William Funk, Constitutional Implications of Regional CO2 Cap-and-Trade
Programs: The Northeast Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative as a Case in Point, 27 UCLA J.
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 353, 358–62 (2009). 
210. Id. at 360.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Funk, supra notes 209, at 361.
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that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement 
of state laws on the same subject.”214 
However, where “the field which Congress is said to have preempted 
includes areas that have been traditionally occupied by the States, 
congressional intent to supersede state laws must be clear and manifest.”215   
Today, the field preemption argument is easily defeated.  However, if 
EPA continues to increase its regulation of greenhouse gas emissions, the 
field preemption argument against interstate cap-and-trade programs may 
strengthen considerably.  For RGGI to be preempted under a field 
preemption theory, Congress must speak to the issue so thoroughly as “to 
make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to 
supplement it.”216  In this context, only one federal law comes to mind—the 
Clean Air Act.  However, the Clean Air Act only tangentially discusses 
greenhouse gas emission regulation217 and vests regulatory authority with 
the states.218  Thus, Congress has not clearly spoken about the field of 
interstate greenhouse gas emission as to preempt states from 
supplementing what little federal regulation currently exists. 
Conflict preemption is a better argument against RGGI, but it would 
likely fail in court as well.  This type of preemption exists when Congress 
214. English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990) (quoting Rice v. Santa
Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)). 
215. Id. (internal quotations omitted) (citing Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430
U.S. 519, 525 (1977), Rice, 331 U.S. at 230). 
216. Id.
217. While there is no federal global warming solutions act, the Supreme
Court has held that Congress delegated the authority to regulate greenhouse gas 
emissions to EPA.  See, e.g., American Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 
2538–39 (2011) (“The Clean Air Act is no less an exercise of the Legislature’s 
considered judgment concerning air pollution regulation because it permits 
emissions until EPA acts.  The critical point is that Congress delegated to EPA the 
decision whether and how to regulate carbon-dioxide emissions from power 
plants . . . .  The Clean Air Act entrusts such complex balancing to EPA in the first 
instance [of decision-making], in combination with state regulators.” (internal 
quotations omitted)).   
218. 42 U.S.C. § 7401(a)(3) (2012) (“The Congress finds that air pollution
prevention . . . and air pollution control at its source is the primary responsibility of 
States and local governments . . . .”); see also Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. S. Coast Air Quality 
Mgmt. Dist., 541 U.S. 246, 260 (2004) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7401(a)(3) and Huron 
Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 442 (1960) (“Legislation designed to 
free from pollution the very air that people breathe clearly falls within the exercise of 
even the most traditional concept of what is compendiously known as the police 
power.”)). 
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intends federal law to exclusively occupy a given field, when it is impossible 
for a private party to comply with both state and federal law, and when the 
challenged state law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and 
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”219  In light of the 
fact that greenhouse gas regulation is virtually absent from the Clean Air 
Act, it is highly unlikely that Congress intended to completely preempt state 
regulation of greenhouse gas emissions.  Moreover, compliance with state 
greenhouse gas emission regulations could actually help states satisfy their 
requirements under the Clean Air Act—dispelling the notion that a private 
citizen could not comply with both state and federal greenhouse gas 
emission laws.220 
IV. Elements of an Effective Greenhouse Gas Regulation
Framework
A successful climate change law should consider the experiences of 
California and Massachusetts.  Both states have broadly worded statutes 
that use a cross-sector approach; a renewable portfolio standard that 
includes all electric power generators; and a statewide cap-and-trade 
program or joint program with other states.  Furthermore, state 
policymakers should incorporate the early lessons learned in California and 
Massachusetts when adopting climate change regulations in their states. 
Developing an understanding of how legal challenges to climate change 
regulation were overcome in other states is critical for policymakers to 
shape flexible regulation that can withstand potential legal challenges. 
A. Statutory Design
The first component of an effective climate change regulation statute 
is a broad delegation of lawmaking authority.  In Massachusetts and 
California, such a delegation enabled important policy evolutions in 
greenhouse gas regulation and proved successful in shielding climate 
change regulation in California from legal challenge.  Both states used short 
statutory language that delegated statutory authority in this field to public 
resource agencies.  For example, in Massachusetts, the legislature directed 
219. Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372–73 (2000)
(internal quotations and citations omitted). 
220. For a brief discussion about a conflict preemption challenge under the
Supreme Court’s decision in American Insurance Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 
(2003) (holding that state law can be preempted by executive branch policy alone), 
see Shelley Welton, State Dynamism, Federal Constraints: Possible Constitutional Hurdles to 
Cross-Border Cap-and-Trade, 27 NAT. RES. & ENV’T 36, 38–39 (2012) (rejecting argument 
that an interstate cap-and-trade program could conflict with the executive branch’s 
international negotiating stance on climate change). 
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the EEA to simply set a greenhouse gas emission reduction target and issue 
a plan to implement that reduction.221  Similarly, the California legislature 
directed CARB to adopt regulations that “achieve the maximum 
technologically feasible and cost-effective greenhouse gas emission 
reductions.”222 
Legislative grants like these have encouraged the development of 
climate change plans in both states because the broad authority provides 
agencies with the flexibility to quickly implement much-needed regulation, 
while also reviewing and building upon their early experiences.  For 
example, the Massachusetts’ legislature directed the EEA to create a policy 
plan with essentially no parameters, except that the plan must implement a 
greenhouse gas emission reduction target chosen by the agency.  This 
allowed interagency coordination within the commonwealth in developing a 
plan that addresses several sectors of the Massachusetts economy. 
Moreover, the Massachusetts Global Warming Solutions Act was an 
outgrowth of existing policy designed to begin a transition to a clean energy 
economy.223  The inherent complexity and unfamiliarity of climate change to 
policymakers means iterative policy development is necessary because it 
creates an opportunity for policymakers to learn from past mistakes and 
adapt to the evolving science of climate change.  CARB’s Scoping Plan is an 
excellent example of an agency developing and consolidating institutional 
knowledge about climate change regulation.  The entire state builds 
expertise as a result of one agency’s iterative experience in regulating this 
otherwise unregulated field.  Empowering agencies to push forward climate 
change regulation gives legislators a bird’s-eye view of where such 
regulation is going.  With this perspective in mind, lawmakers should arm 
agencies with broad statutory tools to address climate change.   
A broad grant of statutory authority to the regulating agency also 
proved successful in protecting California’s Global Warming Solutions Act 
from multiple legal challenges.  Fossil-fuel interests will undoubtedly 
challenge any climate change regulation in court, thus it would be wise for 
state legislators to preemptively protect agency discretion by granting 
agencies quasi-legislative authority under climate change statutes.  Two 
cases challenging AB 32 are characteristic examples of how broad statutory 
authority protects agency discretion in choosing one regulatory mechanism 
over another.  First, in Irritated Residents, the California appellate court 
221. See generally Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 21N (2013).
222. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38562 (West 2014).
223. For example, the Clean Jobs Act of 2008 established a center and a trust
fund that serve as the commonwealth’s guide to the transition to a clean energy 
economy.  See supra, note 185.  This policy tool fosters private investment in clean 
energy, thereby spurring technology innovation and giving policymakers new 
mechanisms to address climate change.  
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concluded that rules implemented under AB 32 have the “dignity of statutes” 
because CARB was granted “quasi-legislative” rulemaking power.224  Second, 
in Citizen’s Climate Lobby, the California trial court noted that AB 32’s broad 
legislative grant enabled CARB to adopt standardized protocols for 
measuring additionality in its cap-and-trade program, even though no other 
comparable cap-and-trade program in the world used this strategy.225  These 
holdings allow CARB to experiment with different regulatory strategies 
without fear of adverse litigation because the broad grant of power afforded 
to the agency pressures courts to defer to CARB’s reasoning.  California 
courts appear even more deferential to the agency’s expertise in this field 
than what is normally expected because they recognize that the legislature 
has limited their standard of review and the agencies themselves are still 
trying to figure out which policy approaches best address climate change. 
This deference enables policy evolution, which will eventually lead to more 
effective climate change regulation in the future. 
Of course, there are drawbacks to yielding rulemaking authority to an 
agency.  State legislatures would be granting authority to potentially 
influence the entire economy.  It may be inappropriate to completely defer 
such far-reaching decision-making power to unelected individuals.  Further, 
if some of these agencies are “captured” by powerful stakeholders, for 
example, utility companies, climate change regulation could be hijacked and 
become a secondary objective.  Conversely, deferring statutory authority to 
an agency acknowledges the fact that agencies have more technical 
expertise than legislatures.  In comparison to the lobbying efforts necessary 
to influence legislators, small stakeholders wielding only minor political 
influence have a better chance at affecting agency rules because the 
rulemaking process is more transparent and bound by enforceable 
procedural rules.  Ultimately, both government bodies will have a role to 
play.  Expert agencies will be better equipped to address climate change 
when they are given the freedom to be creative and iterative.  State 
legislatures can empower an agency by delegating broad lawmaking 
authority, allowing the agency to learn from its experiences. 
An effective climate change statutory regime must be broadly written 
in another sense as well.  The statute must also include a cross-sector 
approach to minimizing greenhouse gas emissions.  Both California and 
Massachusetts wisely allowed their agencies to regulate all major 
greenhouse gas emitters in their respective economies.  Both states’ climate 
action plans include policies for individual sectors, such as agriculture, 
energy efficiency, transportation, marine vessels and ports, and energy 
224. Ass’n of Irritated Residents v. Cal. Air Res. Bd., 143 Cal. Rptr. 3d 65, 71
(Cal. Ct. App. 2012). 
225. Citizens Climate Lobby v. Cal. Air Res. Bd., No. CGC-12-519554, 2013 WL
861396, at *6 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 25, 2013). 
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generation.  Massachusetts’ plan even adds consideration of climatic 
impacts to its environmental policy act.  A cross-sector approach to seeking 
emissions reductions is important because climate change has systematic 
consequences.   
The most important economic sectors to address are energy 
generation and transportation.  While addressing other sectors may depend 
on the specific situation of a given state, energy generation and 
transportation raises issues common to all states.  Transitioning these two 
sectors to mainly renewable fuels can be achieved through an RPS and an 
LCFS.  Pushing utilities and vehicle manufacturers to evolve their energy mix 
is best achieved by requiring them to reach certain quotas of purchased 
renewable energy.  All states should adopt renewable portfolio standards 
that direct energy utilities to purchase incrementally increasing amounts of 
renewable energy over time.  Both California and Massachusetts are already 
considering increasing their renewable energy goals because their initial 
efforts at establishing renewable portfolio standards have proven both 
viable and successful.  California’s LCFS is a model for ten other states, 
including Massachusetts, expanding the effect of California’s relatively 
stringent transportation fuel rules to nearly 25% of the American vehicle 
market.226  Establishing fuel standards in both the energy and transportation 
sectors is crucial to regulating greenhouse gas emissions because they 
significantly contribute to climate change. 
Major climatic variation will impact all natural resources, which 
inherently underlie all phases of a state’s economy.  Moreover, every sector 
of a state’s economy contributes to climate change, even if those emissions 
disproportionately come from the transportation and energy generation 
sectors.  Therefore, climate change regulation must take a top-down 
approach because the nature of climate change and its latent consequences 
are such that all phases of society are impacted by regulation, or lack 
thereof.  
B. Cap-and-Trade Program
States must look to a market based compliance mechanism to achieve 
greenhouse gas emission reductions.  California and Massachusetts have 
both adopted cap-and-trade programs as alternatives to direct taxation of 
emissions.  Other states should either create or join existing cap-and-trade 
programs because this method of carbon regulation is the most politically 
palatable method of limiting greenhouse gas emissions.  The experiences of 
California and Massachusetts demonstrate that regulating greenhouse gas 
226. AIR RES. BD. & CAL. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, FIRST UPDATE TO THE CLIMATE 
CHANGE SCOPING PLAN 49 (2014), available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/scopingplan/ 
2013_update/first_update_climate_change_scoping_plan.pdf.  
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emissions via a cap-and-trade program is politically viable, despite the 
logistical burdens presented by cap-and-trade.   
Massachusetts and its neighboring northeastern states provide a great 
example of a successful, though nascent, regional cap-and-trade model. 
RGGI distributes offset allowances to industries in member states through 
an online platform that enables the public to view and download reports of 
program data and allowance activity.227  Through this program, 
Massachusetts has begun to target twenty-seven major emitters of 
greenhouse gas emissions in its state, which together constitute 16% of 
RGGI’s total carbon budget.228    
Smaller states should share expertise and support to begin regulating 
greenhouse gas emissions within their geographic regions, using RGGI as a 
model.  Larger states can look to California’s statewide cap-and-trade 
program.  Capping regional emissions from a handful of states is likely more 
feasible when a state with the amount of California’s emissions is not 
involved.  By itself, California’s greenhouse gas program is the second 
largest such program in the world and regulates several greenhouse gas 
emission sources in California beyond what is statutorily required by AB 
32.229   
These fledgling emissions trading mechanisms are an important first 
step in regulating greenhouse gas emissions; however, both programs have 
also drawn criticism.  Notably, neither state adopted any direct tax on 
greenhouse gas emissions as a means of regulating such emissions.  In 
California, CARB completely rejected a carbon tax as a market based 
compliance mechanism and provided meaningful evidence supporting this 
decision only after being directed to by a trial court.230  In place of a carbon 
tax, Massachusetts enacted extensive economic incentives for its economy 
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.231  Its participation in RGGI also 
indicates the commonwealth’s preference against direct taxation as a 
method of regulating greenhouse gas emissions.  Obviously, both states 
have avoided direct taxation because it is a politically unpalatable method 
of regulating greenhouse gas emissions.  This is unfortunate because 
directly taxing emissions appears on its face to be an intuitively simpler 
method of curtailing emissions.  If entities are specifically taxed, they are 
227. See Ne. Bancorp, Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 472 U.S.
159, 175 (1985). 
228. See Reg’l Greenhouse Gas Initiative, RGGI States Propose Lowering
Regional CO2 Emissions Cap 45% (Feb. 7, 2013), http://www.rggi.org/docs/ 
PressReleases/PR130207_ModelRule.pdf. 
229. AIR RES. BD. & CAL. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, supra note 226 at 86.
230. Ass’n of Irritated Residents v. Cal. Air Res. Bd., 143 Cal. Rptr. 3d 65, 71
(Cal. Ct. App. 2012). 
231. See, e.g., Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 23J (2013) et seq.
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compelled to minimize the act resulting in higher taxes.  Instead both states 
must now deal with the Achilles’ heel of cap-and-trade programs—
measuring the additionality of carbon emissions.   
The inherent complexity of measuring additionality cannot be 
understated.  Measuring additionality is a near impossible task and both 
California’s program and the cap-and-trade program established by the 
Kyoto Protocol have endured this criticism.232  When reviewing greenhouse 
gas emissions regulatory regimes, courts are also limited in their standard of 
review for two reasons: (1) statutory restrictions; and (2) they have 
essentially no expertise in determining whether one additionality 
measurement system is more reasonable than another.233  A direct tax on 
greenhouse gas emissions would avoid all of these issues and focus simply 
on the amount of emissions actually emitted by a given source—a task 
much more easily understood than measuring the amount of carbon 
emissions that would not have been emitted in the hypothetical scenario 
wherein a cap-and-trade program did not exist.   
As a result of the underlying political unpopularity of taxing 
greenhouse gas emissions, states are left with an indirect method of forcing 
industry to reduce their carbon emissions.  However, at this point in time, 
any method of regulating greenhouse gas emissions is sorely needed. 
Taxing carbon directly would probably be an easier and more effective 
method of regulating greenhouse gas emissions, but political feasibility 
must inevitably be considered when adopting a law with such far-reaching 
impacts.  Currently, the most politically popular method of regulating a 
state’s carbon emissions on a broad scale appears to be cap-and-trade. 
States should adopt policies to support a cap-and-trade program and either 
create their own system or join an existing one.  California and 
Massachusetts have proven the early viability of these regional programs 
and have the growing institutional expertise needed to assist other states in 
participating in this effort.  Even though standardized additionality 
mechanisms have come under fire, they could ultimately prove to be an 
improvement from traditional case-by-case measurement systems.  States 
need to begin limiting greenhouse gas emissions as soon as possible and 
cap-and-trade appears to be the most politically feasible method of doing 
so.   
232. See, e.g., Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir.
2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2884 (2014), and 134 S. Ct. 2875 (2014); Cal. Exec. Order S-
01-07 (Jan.  2007), available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/fuels/lcfs/eos0107.pdf.
233. See Citizens Climate Lobby v. Cal. Air Res. Bd., No. CGC-12-519554, 2013
WL 861396, at *10 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 25, 2013). 
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V. Conclusion
In sum, California and Massachusetts provide other states with models
for regulating greenhouse gas emissions within their own states.  Their 
experiences in designing policy and defending agency action in court 
highlight the challenges that other states should work to avoid when making 
their own climate change law.  States should adopt both fuel standards and 
cap-and-trade programs as soon as possible because these are the best 
politically viable tools for reducing greenhouse gas emissions.  The early 
efforts of California and Massachusetts should serve other states as a guide 
to establishing these regulatory programs. 
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